Xenophobia and Radicalism in the UK (2017)
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Introduction

The pace of events in Britain relating to xenophobia and radical right extremism is quickening. At the time of this report’s completion in mid-June 2018, several different features of xenophobia and radicalism have emerged that underscore the metastasising nature of racial and religious hatred that have gathered pace since the pivotal ‘Brexit’ vote on 23 June 2016. First, during the week of 6 March 2018, letters were sent around the UK announcing that 3 April 2018 would be ‘Punish a Muslim day’. Through a demented ‘points system’, the letter incites attacks against Muslim individuals and institutions. For example, 10 points would be earned for verbal abuse; 25 points for pulling a Muslim woman’s head scarf; 250 points for murder; and 1,000 points for physically attacking a Mosque. In mid-June 2018 it was announced that a 35-year old man was arrested on suspicion of compiling the letters, and was charged with 14 offenses, including soliciting murder.¹

Secondly, also in early June the radical right activist and ‘journalist’, Stephen Yaxley-Lennon (aka Tommy Robinson) was sentenced to 13 months for contempt of court for again breaching reporting restrictions on a child sexual exploitation case in Leeds. Galvanising radical right activists, a ‘Free Tommy’ demonstration on 9 June 2018 witnessed some 15,000 activists, sporadic violence and numerous arrests in chaotic scenes in central London.² This makes clear that large street demonstrations – now nearly a decade old in Britain – organised by the radical right are far from a thing of the past. Likewise not a thing of the past is British neo-Nazism, as made clear in the most recent in a series of ongoing trials of the proscribed terrorist organisation, National Action. As reported by the BBC, the group allegedly continued to engage in ‘meetings and training’ after being banned at the end of 2016. At the time of writing, in the current trial one purported member of the continuity organisation admitted to plotting the assassination of a British MP with a machete.³

The wider contexts of these activities are covered in this annual review. This includes discussion of the ‘mainstreaming’ of racist and xenophobic views, as well as the developing legislation to address and counter it. An essential backdrop to these developments was the historic vote to leave the European Union on 23 June 2016 – leaving millions of European citizens in ‘limbo’, while also exposing the vulnerability of other vulnerable groups – in large part driven by the far-right party the United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP). The collapse of the latter’s vote share over the last two years has only added to the fragmentation of the far- and radical right scene in Britain; to some extent at least, opening the door for lone actors and more radical, often street-based, movements. The responses by the two main parties, Labour and the Conservatives, as well as their own responses to xenophobia and radicalism, are central considerations in what follows. Finally, five recommendations for practical action to counter rising xenophobia and radicalism are appended at the conclusion of this report.

1. **Overview of Legislation Protecting Minorities**

The UK has a large array of legislation to combat racial and religious discrimination. Although also cast into some uncertainty by the decision to leave the European Union on 29 March 2019, at the time of writing the United Kingdom remains a signatory to the European Charter of Fundamental Human Rights, and has also acceded to all international agreements protecting the rights of minority populations in Europe. While codified rights for subjects are not enshrined in the constitution (that is, a single, authoritative document like in the United States), a number of authoritative charters and statutes govern democratic relations; including the landmark Magna Carta (1215) and the Bill of Rights (1689), through to the Great Reform Act (1832) and more recent the Human Rights Act (1998). The latter initiative has helped enshrine certain political, civil and social rights in Britain over the last generation, while providing a key form of protection for ethnic and religious minorities.

Focusing more closely upon anti-discrimination measures, Britain has a number of legal initiatives to combat religious and racial hatred, discrimination against sexual, religious and racial minorities, and hate crime. Introduced under the Labour Prime Minister, James Callaghan, perhaps the most important Parliamentary Act to deal with racial discrimination is the 1976 Race Relations Act, which prohibits discrimination based on a person’s colour, race, nationality, ethnic or national origin. The 1976 Race Relations Act was, however, later subsumed and superseded by the 2010 Equality Act, which introduced nine key protected characteristics: age, disability, gender reassignment, marriage and civil partnership, pregnancy and maternity, race, religion or belief, sex and sexual orientation. This helped to harmonise fully nine previous pieces of legalisation in order to protect individuals from discrimination based on sex, age, religious belief, and disability. The net effect was to legislate against both direct and indirect discrimination, harassment and victimisation; including public and private places of work, but also leisure and travel.

Looking more specifically at safeguards against specific acts of discrimination, the 1986 Public Order Act, the Crime and Disorder Act 1998 and the Criminal Justice Act 2003 all have provisions against racial and religious harassment and hate crime. In terms of the former, Section 5 of the Public Order Act outlaws the use of threatening (or abusive) words or behaviour, as well as writing, signs or any other visible representation which is threatening (or abusive). Moreover, Sections 18 and 19 of the Public Order Act stipulates that offences or written materials intended to stir up racial hatred, or that which has a likelihood of stirring up racial hatred, is outlawed. In terms of the latter, Sections 28–32 of the Crime and Disorder Act 1998 and Sections 145 and 146 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 allow prosecutors to apply for an uplift in sentence for those convicted of a hate crime.

During the period under review, there were no substantial changes in anti-discrimination legislation in the UK. This did not, however, stop an appetite for reform to, and expansion of, discrimination law.

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– especially in light of the UK’s forthcoming departure from the European Union. On 23 January 2018, for instance, the Women’s movement NGO, the Fawcett Society, released a report into sex discrimination law – finding that one in five women aged over 16 had experienced sexual harassment.\(^\text{10}\) It called for a fundamental reform of anti-discrimination legislation in order to enhance protections of women against harassment, as well as to make misogyny a specific hate crime.\(^\text{11}\) In a related, and slightly concerning, survey conducted by the solicitors firm, GQ Employment Law, two-thirds (65%) of employer respondents suggested that they would like changes to discrimination and equal pay laws once the UK had left the EU – with 28% subset wanting to see a cap on awards given as a result of legal action.\(^\text{12}\)

2. Law enforcement procedures

The main safeguards against discrimination in everyday life and the workplace in the UK are the Equalities and Human Rights Commission and Tribunals Service. The former was set up on 1 October 2007 with particular powers to challenge discrimination, promote equality of opportunity and protect human rights.\(^\text{13}\) It was created out of three pre-existing equality organisations (the Commission for Racial Equality, the Disability Rights Commission and the Equal Opportunities Commission) and operates independently from the UK Government.\(^\text{14}\) The latter service houses key institutions for recourse against discrimination within the workplace and against the state. In particular, Employment Tribunals and Asylum and Immigration Tribunals provide key legal fora for individuals feeling unfairly discriminated against based upon their religious, racial or ethnic background.\(^\text{15}\)

While hate crime is systematically recorded by a number of police constabularies, there still remains concerns with systemic underreporting and differences in recording practices across the UK. In the period under study, for example, South Wales Police suggested that, while official figures released in October 2017 showed a 29% increase in hate crimes, trust and confidence in the police amongst minority communities was a major factor in underreporting.\(^\text{16}\) Moreover, comparisons between officially collated figures and the Crime Survey for England and Wales (CSEW) also highlight the issue. In 2013, for example, 278,000 hate crimes were reported on the basis of race, religion, gender, disability, gender identity and sexual orientation. This is compared with the 42,236 hate crime offences recorded nationally by the police.\(^\text{17}\) Finally, the patchwork nature of hate crime statistics and how they are gathered in the UK sometimes makes it hard to ascertain the scale of the problem.

\(^{10}\) Gordon, S. (23 January 2018) ‘Review finds UK discrimination law requires fundamental reform’. Financial Times, online at: [www.ft.com/content/eea9d4ae-ffc8-11e7-9650-9c0ad2d7c5b5](http://www.ft.com/content/eea9d4ae-ffc8-11e7-9650-9c0ad2d7c5b5).

\(^{11}\) Ibid.


\(^{14}\) Ibid.


In recent years, there has been criticism of intransigence by UK police forces in recognising disablist and transgender hate crime.\(^{18}\)

3. Rhetoric in Britain toward minorities

A heated debate has arisen in the UK in recent years over the role of elite discourse in stoking popular anti-immigrant sentiment. In this respect, 2017 was no exception. In August 2017, a report by the All Party Parliamentary Group on Social Integration suggested that Conservative Government’s target of cutting net migration to less than 100,000 was particularly to blame for stoking anxieties and driving forward hate crime following the 2016 Brexit vote.\(^{20}\) Moreover, the same report identified rhetoric used by key British politicians in the 2016 referendum campaign in ‘licensing’ individuals to act on racist attitudes – which had previously gone unexpressed – and go onto commit hate crimes in the wake of the 23 June 2016 vote.\(^{21}\) Moreover, this was picked up by the international community: the U.N.’s Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination noted that the ‘divisive, anti-immigrant and xenophobic rhetoric’ of the referendum campaign, plus the failure of politicians to condemn racist abuse, had led to a surge in attacks after the vote.\(^{22}\) This represented unusually strong language from the United Nations.

Looking into specific anti-minority rhetoric in 2017, there were a few instances of British MPs engaging in racist, xenophobic or discriminatory speech. Perhaps one of the highest profile cases was that of the MP for Newton Abbott, Anne Marie Morris. She was suspended from the Conservative Party in July 2017 for describing the prospect of the UK leaving the EU with no deal as ‘the real n***r in the woodpile’.\(^{23}\) The phrase was used at a private event organised by the Politeia think tank, and was roundly condemned as ‘belong[ing] to the era of Jim Crow.’\(^{24}\) The UK government stopped short of withdrawing the whip from Morris – one of the stiffest Parliamentary penalties for a sitting MP.

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\(^{24}\) Bennett, O. (10 July 2017) ‘Tory MP Anne Marie Morris Recorded Saying Brexit No Deal Is A ’N***** In A Woodpile’. Huffington Post UK, online at: www.huffingtonpost.co.uk/entry/tory-mp-racist-brexit-recording_uk_59638608e4b02e9b8b0e2c77?utm_hp_ref=uk.
Looking more closely at the Government level, Greg Hands, a Trade Minister within the Department for Exiting the European Union, became embroiled in controversy over an anti-Semitic tweet. Taking target at a Labour MP who had been suspended over accusations of sexual harassment, Hands described the MP in question, Ivan Lewis, as a ‘Jewish Blairite’ but apologised shortly after for a ‘carelessly worded’ tweet and deleted his original comments. His original remarks were used to make a comparison between the Lewis case (i.e. suspension) and the verbal reprimand received by another Labour MP in 2010 for calling a black London Greater Assembly Member a ‘ghetto boy’. On a similar anti-Semitic theme, news came to light in December 2017 that pro-Israeli activists had been barred from a meeting at which the Palestinian Authority ambassador, Manuel Hassassian, had given a speech – accusing the UK of ‘still doing trade relations and still sympathising with the Jews as being the victims of the Holocaust. Enough of this rhetoric. We have made and paid for this historic concession...’ The Scottish National Party MP, Mark Sheppard, was subsequently investigated by the Parliamentary Commissioner for Standards for breach of the MP’s Code of Conduct after it came to light that he had hosted the event. Hassassian later denied his comments were anti-Semitic.

Finally, and looking towards anti-Muslim rhetoric, there were several instances of British MPs being involved in Islamophobic conduct in 2017. In October 2017, for example, Conservative MP for Harrow East, Bob Blackman, invited anti-Islam activist, Tapan Ghosh, to deliver a speech at an event, named ‘Tolerating the Intolerant: 800 years of defending human rights’. Ghosh has previously called on the UN to stop Muslims from having children; blamed the Rohingya people for their own ethnic cleansing; and has been previously affiliated with key activists within Britain’s anti-Islam movement (in particular the former EDL leader, Tommy Robinson). Commenting upon the event, Labour MP, Wes Streeting, noted that: ‘Tapan Ghosh has form – both in making inflammatory and bigoted remarks about Muslims and in holding connections with the far-right in the UK and in India.’ Such anti-Muslim rhetoric has not however been limited to the Conservative party. In May 2017, a Labour Party candidate was forced to withdraw over a tweet that called from the eradication of Islam from Europe. Moreover, in August 2017, the MP for Rotherham, Sarah Champion, was


29 Ibid.

forced to resign her frontbench position after writing a column in the Sun newspaper claiming that ‘British Pakistani men ARE raping and exploiting white girls... and it’s time we faced up to it.’

4. Position of immigrants

There have been no major changes in immigration law in the UK under the period of study. That said, a Private Members Bill was introduced by a backbench Conservative Member of Parliament (MP), Chris Chope, to create offences with respect to migrants who have entered the UK illegally or who have remained in the UK without legal authority. It will be debated in Parliament on Friday 6 July 2018. This proposed legislation builds up on the 2016 Immigration Act which introduces new sanctions for on illegal working, prevents illegal migrants accessing services and gave the UK Border Force new powers to target people smugglers in UK territorial waters. At the time of writing, there remains a great uncertainty about the future of more than 3 million EU citizens in Britain following the latter’s withdrawal from the European Union on 29 March 2019. There have been no guarantees given by Parliament to EU citizens residing the UK during the present monitoring period.

5. Social attitudes towards immigrants, foreign nationals and various ethnic minorities

Much recent scholarship in Britain has been devoted to focusing upon anti-migrant attitudes and its links to Brexit. In June 2017, a study by Dr Rose Meleady, Charles R. Seger, and Marieke Vermue found that xenophobia was the greatest predictor of voting leave (0.51) when compared with political conservatism (0.43), negative contact with migrants (0.43) and age (0.15). Moreover, their study of just over 400 individuals before the 2016 EU referendum vote found that those with more positive contact with EU migrants tended to have a stronger intention to vote Remain, while the intermediary variable that helped explain such voting behaviour was reduced prejudice, which arose from greater multicultural contact. Additional, a November 2017 study led by a group of academics at Goldsmiths, University of London, again found supporting evidence that xenophobia was a strong predictive factor in June 2016’s successful Leave vote. In particular, their polls of 300 people after the Referendum tested three individual predictors of prejudice: a belief in national greatness, right wing authoritarianism, and social dominance orientation. They found that what they termed ‘collective narcissism’ (0.39), right wing authoritarianism (0.35), and social dominance orientation

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31 Champion, S. (10 August 2017) ‘British Pakistani men ARE raping and exploiting white girls... and it’s time we faced up to it.’ The Sun, online at: www.thesun.co.uk/news/4218648/british-pakistani-men-raping-exploiting-white-girls/.
Looking more broadly at xenophobic attitudes, however, reported figures by the EU’s annual Eurobarometer survey found that negative perceptions of immigration and its importance as an issue had actually decreased in the wake of the Brexit vote. In fact, positive feelings toward migrants from other EU states rose more markedly in the UK than the cross-EU average – an increase from 49% to 58% positivity – whilst concerns over immigration almost halved, with only 6% citing it as the most important issue facing them personally. This may be unsurprising in light the June 2016 result (with 51.9% of voters choosing to leave the European Union) however, reported attitudes towards the EU itself were more in line with recent voting patterns, with a majority (51%) taking a pessimistic view of the EU’s future and 48% of respondents claiming optimism about the UK’s future outside of the EU. Another longitudinal study carried out by the polling and market research company, Ipsos MORI, also confirmed these upward social trends regarding immigration. Polling 4,000 voters across seven waves, the company found that people in the UK had become more positive towards immigration (from 35% to 46%) but also wished for immigration to be reduced – with over 60% feeling that it should either be reduced a little or a lot.

Turning to the theme of anti-Muslim prejudice in British society more broadly, several opinion polls conducted in the period under review have fleshed out trends regarding anti-Muslim prejudice. In September 2017, a poll of over 2000 people conducted by YouGov on behalf of Arab News found that 72% of British subjects believed that anti-Muslim hatred had gotten worse in recent years – with a similar proportion (70%) agreeing that Islamophobic comments made by politicians risked fuelling hate crime. This recognition did not however result in a diminution in prejudice against Arab and Muslim populations – with nearly two thirds of respondents (63%) saying that Arabs who came to the UK had failed to integrate into Western society, and more than half (55%) agreeing that racial profiling of Muslims and Arabs for security reasons was justifiable. Moreover, in a separate study conducted by the international affairs think tank, Chatham House, 47% of UK respondents supported the cessation of migration from Muslim majority countries and noted that public estimates of the UK Muslim population were three times higher than actual figures. In addition, the anti-fascist campaigning organisation, Hope not Hate’s, 2017 ‘Fear and Hope’ poll found that

39 Ibid., pp.9 & 10.
42% of English people were more suspicious of Muslims as a result of the London and Manchester terror attacks – with a further 52% seeing Islam as a serious threat to Western civilisation.43

Turning to anti-Semitic prejudice in the UK, one of the largest (n=5,466) investigations into attitudes towards Jews and Israel was published in the period under study. In September 2017, the Institute for Jewish Policy Research (in partnership with the Community Security Trust, Britain’s chief monitoring agency for anti-Semitism) found that more than a quarter (30%) of people in British society hold at least some anti-Semitic attitudes – although only 2.4% of British adults were strongly anti-Semitic.44 Moreover, whilst 56% of the UK population held at least some anti-Israel views, only 12% nursed ‘hard-core negativity’ towards the Jewish state.45 In conclusion, the report identified an ‘elastic’ view of anti-Semitism, distinguishing between those who are clearly committed to anti-Semitic ideas and those who have more casual anti-Semitic views.46 Rather controversially, the report also found that Muslims were two to four times more likely to hold anti-Semitic and anti-Israel attitudes than the general population.47

Finally, 2017 marked a milestone for the LGBT community in the UK: the reporting period marked the 50th anniversary of the Sexual Offences Act 1967, which decriminalised homosexuality in the UK.48 Articles published at the time suggested that favourability towards same-sex couples has quadrupled (from 17% to 64%) and that young people were five times more likely to identify as gay, lesbian or bisexual than their older counterparts.49 The main issue to re-emerge onto the public policy agenda during the time of writing was the legalisation of same-sex marriage in Northern Ireland.50 Opinion polls during the period of study showed majority support for such an initiative – with a September 2017 LucidTalk Survey finding that 61.04% of people were in favour of same-sex unions, while 32.47% of people were against.51 Meanwhile, looking at the legislative level where the decision on legalisation will ultimately be made, historic votes in the Northern Ireland Assembly have shown politicians to be more finely split on the issue, with an April 2015 motion being defeated by a majority of two and a November 2015 plenary debate ending in a small majority (50.48%) in favour.52


45 Ibid., p.5.

46 Ibid., p.3.

47 Ibid., p.6.


6. Radical Groups and Parties

The United Kingdom has often been seen as an exceptional case when it comes to the success of radical right parties. One key trope within the UK literature on right-wing extremism was its abject failure to make any appreciable impact upon UK electoral politics. In his 1996 chapter in a co-edited book regarding the ‘Failure of British Fascism’, for example, Roger Griffin likened the UK radical right to an ‘ugly duckling’ in comparison with some of its European brethren.53 Limited by a First Past the Post electoral system and a political cultural consensus in respect of ‘moderation, a hatred of fanaticism, an aversion to demagogy, uniforms and overt racism’,54 Britain’s radical right has been left to ‘scratch around indefinitely without ever coming out as a swan’.55 It was therefore recognised that the post-war anti-fascist consensus and a strong civic culture had immunised the UK and its political institutions from all forms of radical right extremism.56

Such an anti-fascist consensus and exceptionalism to radical nationalist groups and parties has, however, been sorely tested over the past two decades. During the 2000’s, the neo-fascist British National Party (BNP) started to moderate its ideology away from a more extreme form of palinlogenic nationalism (i.e. national rebirth after a period of moral decadence) towards a radical right populist stance – expressing nativist and nationalist scepticism in the areas of immigration, welfare and the European Union.57 This was typified at the 2005 UK General Election when the BNP’s manifesto included pledges to withdraw from the EU, to bring back grammar schools, cut immigration, and increase security.58 The result of this moderation was significant electoral success for the party – winning more than 50 Council seats, two seats in the European Parliament and one on the devolved Greater London Assembly. Largely due to infighting over finances and the divisive nature of its chairman, Nick Griffin, the party’s electoral bubble burst after failing to gain Parliamentary representation at the 2010 General Election – returning the party to the electoral wilderness and quickly spiralling into irrelevance. At the 2017 General Election, for example, the party was unable to score more than 4,500 votes – down from just over 500,000 seven years prior.59

As the BNP star rose and began to wane, a new party, the UK Independence Party (UKIP), came to take its place in the UK – again testing the UK’s resilience to extremist parties. For most of its history, UKIP was electorally irrelevant. Founded in 1993 as a way of converting Conservatives to hard Euroscepticism, its early attempts at electoral breakthrough were thwarted by infighting and stronger Eurosceptic opponents (such as James Goldsmith’s Referendum Party). Briefly successful under the leadership of Robert Kilroy-Silk in 2004, it wasn’t until Nigel Farage, a former City banker and one of UKIP’s first MEPs, assumed the leadership for a second time in November 2010 that the

55 Griffin, R. Op Cit. p. 163.
party took off, transforming UKIP from a single-issue movement into an ideologically broad-based, far-right party able to fuse anti-EU politics with socially conservative, anti-migrant, and anti-elite messages.\textsuperscript{60} Becoming an insurgent actor in British politics it came first, ahead of all other mainstream parties, in the 2014 European Elections – in the process, scoring over 4 million votes at the 2015 General Election. Witnessing key defections from the UK Conservative Party in 2014, it was thus able to gain Parliamentary representation for the first time. Owing to the exit of Farage and seeming lack of purpose after the 2016 Brexit vote to leave the EU, however, the party has also entered the electoral wilderness in the monitoring period. It returned just under 600,000 votes at the 2017 General Election.\textsuperscript{61} In so doing, the party also lost nearly all of its Council seats at the May 2018 UK local elections.\textsuperscript{62} In this atmosphere, questions are rightly being raised with regard to the electoral viability of the party going forwards.\textsuperscript{63}

In parallel with the developments at the party political level has seen the rise of radical nationalist street movements in the UK – especially in the period after the BNP’s collapse. In June 2009, the anti-Islam English Defence League (EDL) street movement emerged as a strident voice against what it saw as the ‘creeping effects’ of ‘Islamisation’ in UK public life.\textsuperscript{64} Able to mobilise thousands of loyal foot soldiers for its events, it hosted over fifty major demonstrations up and down the UK until the exit of its founder, Tommy Robinson, in October 2013.\textsuperscript{65} The EDL continues to be active – hosting 13 demonstrations in 2017 – but the scale of its demonstrations has dropped significantly – with its best turnout in the monitoring period some 200 activists.\textsuperscript{66}

Yet the EDL is not the only street-based movement to emerge in the wake of the BNP’s collapse. In May 2011, another anti-Islam protest movement and political party, Britain First, emerged on the UK radical nationalist scene. Led by a former BNP Councillor, Paul Golding, Britain First has gained notoriety for its ‘Mosque Invasions’, ‘Christian Patrols’, and demonstrations held in areas with sizeable Muslim populations in the UK that are explicitly designed to provoke minority communities. Despite garnering a significant online following (nearly 2.3 million Facebook followers), it was in fact offline actions by the group caught up with the movement in 2017 – with both leaders facing time in prison for conducting a Cardiff ‘Mosque Invasion’ in November 2016\textsuperscript{67} and an aggressive leafleting

\textsuperscript{63} Mance, H. and Tighe, C. (16 April 2018) ‘Ukip contests local elections as questions swirl over its survival’. The Financial Times, online at: www.ft.com/content/e76d6798-3e5a-11e8-b7e0-52972418fec4.
\textsuperscript{64} EDL Website. ‘Mission Statement’, online at: www.englishdefenceleague.org.uk/mission-statement/.
campaign against an Asian-owned takeaway restaurants in May 2017. As of spring 2018, the movement and its leaders have been banned from Facebook and Twitter.

In addition to Britain First, two other significant radical nationalist movements have emerged in the post-2010 period. Founded in 2013, the neo-Nazi group National Action (NA) has quickly established itself as one of the most violent and concerning movements to ever emerge on the UK extreme right. Uncompromising adherents of National Socialism and outspoken admirers of Hitler, the group came to public attention in 2014 after viciously trolling a Liverpool Labour MP, Luciana Berger who is Jewish. In June 2015, things took a more sinister turn when NA activist Zack Davies was convicted of the attempted murder of a Sikh Doctor with a claw hammer and a machete. After the proscription of the group as a terrorist organisation in December 2016, news came to light in the monitoring period of the group’s persisting activates under the pseudonyms Scottish Dawn and NS131. Arrests and ongoing trials of individuals connected with National Action are continuing – with two soldiers and more than a dozen other individuals either recently or currently going through court – and therefore subject to reporting bans.

The final group and most recent group in this re-emergence on the British radical nationalist scene from the ballot box to the streets is the Football Lads Alliance. Formed in June 2017 by property manager and Tottenham Hotspur fan, John Meighan, the movement successfully hosted its first demonstration on 24 June 2017 in the immediate aftermath of several UK-based terror attacks – mobilising nearly 10,000 supporters to its first London protest. At its subsequent 7 October 2017 protest, the group managed to mobilise again in central London – turning out nearly 30,000 activists marching under the banner of ‘uniting against extremism’, and lobbying for a harder line against Islamist terrorists. At the group’s protest on 24th March 2018, another estimated 7,000 people demonstrated in Birmingham against terrorism and extremism – with the emergence of a splinter group, the Democratic Football Lads Alliance. On 16 April 2018, it was announced that John

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Meighan had left the FLA. The most recent protest was on 19 May 2018 – one year to the day after the 2017 Manchester arena bombings – although the number of activists was only in the hundreds, rather than the thousands seen previously.

Turning to what some see as the mirror image of radical nationalist groups in the UK, radical Islamist groups have also been a problematic feature of the extremist scene in Britain over the last two decades and more recently. Mobilising a critical response to Western foreign policy interventions abroad, perceived illiberal security interventions at home and in some cases demanding the overthrow of democracy itself, several such groups have been proscribed by the UK Government for their fostering and support of domestic and international terrorism. Prominent examples include Al-Qaida and Al-Muhajiroun – with the latter implicated in a 2007 fertiliser bomb plot, a May 2013 case of domestic terrorism against a serving British army soldier and a terror attack involving a truck at London Bridge in June 2017. Like with National Action, Al-Muhajiroun has tried to change its title in order to get around proscription measures – going under the names ‘Islam4UK’, ‘Need4Khilafah’ and ‘the Shariah Project.’ Such attempts have however been largely thwarted by the UK Government – with the Home Office banning subsequent iterations of these groups.

Aside from providing foment for violent extremism, Al-Muhajiroun has also shown potential to create the polarising conditions needed for other forms of extremism to exist in the UK. Interestingly, and in a case of cumulative extremism where ‘one form of extremism can feed off and magnify other forms [of extremism],’ the English Defence League and its subsequent round of street protests across the UK emerged out of localised opposition to an Al-Muhajiroun protest in the South Bedfordshire town of Luton. Moreover, and in the period under study, it was found that earlier Islamist terror attacks in 2017 at least provided some tactical basis for Darren Osborne’s June 2017 Finsbury Park Mosque terror attack – with the use of cruder vehicular attacks one key factor in the lack of intervention and disruption by UK authorities.

Another key group of note on the UK’s radical Islamist scene is the more tactically moderate, Hizb ut-Tahrir (HT). Part of a wider transnational pan-Islamic movement to re-establish the ‘Islamic Khilafah’ and finding its ideological basis in a radical critique of Western democracy, Hizb ut-Tahrir UK was established pre-9/11 to mobilise young Muslims to its ‘radical, but to date non-violent

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77 Bryant, B. and Frymorgen, T. (1 May 2018) ‘Football Lads Alliance: “We could have a civil war in this country”’. BBC Three, online at: www.bbc.co.uk/bbcthree/article/e5ee9e0a-18d7-49a4-a3c2-80b6b4222058.


Islamist’ cause on University campuses in the early 1990s.\textsuperscript{83} Courting controversy for its ‘anti-semitic, anti-western and homophobic views’,\textsuperscript{84} HT has been considered for proscription on several occasions in 2005, 2007, 2009 and 2015. However, and largely due to successful ideological moderation and counter-tactics after the 2005 London Bombings, the organisation has never received a UK Government ban. This therefore cuts to the quick of legal versus normative restrictions around such groups – with many ministers hesitant to ban HT UK due to its largely non-violent nature.\textsuperscript{85} It also comes amidst news during the period of reporting (2017) that Indonesia has been the latest of thirteen countries to ban HT for threatening ‘national unity’.\textsuperscript{86}

7. Xenophobia amongst Sports Fans

As in many other Western democracies, there have been key historic overlaps between the radical right groups and sport supporters in the UK – especially in relation to football. In the 1980’s, for example, both the neo-fascist National Front and neo-Nazi British Movement actively recruited football hooligan ‘firms’ based in London and the South East.\textsuperscript{87} Moreover, after failing electorally in the 1987 General Election, the neo-fascist British National Party also adopted similar techniques in the late 1980’s – concomitant with a ‘march and grow’ style of street activism – recruiting a tiny pool of some 80 activists from football hooligans largely based in Leeds and Glasgow.\textsuperscript{88} More contemporaneously, both the anti-Islam street movements, the English Defence League (EDL) and the Football Lads Alliance (FLA), have relied on both supporters and football ‘causals’ to rally large numbers in support to their cause. For example, a 2015 study by Dr Joel Busher found that 30-40% of the activists he spoke to had entered the EDL directly from the football scene.\textsuperscript{89} Moreover, and looking more concretely at the period under study, early reports in 2017 suggested that rank-and-file activists within the FLA were almost exclusively drawn from - and indeed grew out of – ‘football firms’ that have put aside their match day rivalries in order to unite against what they identify as Islamist extremism.\textsuperscript{90}

These instances of organised xenophobia and radicalism amongst football fans have, however, not gone unchecked by civil society. One of the leading initiatives to combat racism and discrimination in

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\item \textsuperscript{84} Ibid.
Sport in the UK has been Show Racism the Red Card (SRtRC). Founded in 1996 as an anti-racism educational charity, SRtRC uses football, football players and educational programmes in order to help tackle racism in British society. Every year, the charity reaches around 50,000 people through its workshops, educational events and training days. Furthermore, it has also been successful in tendering for government-sponsored programmes targeted at tackling extremism and hate crime. For example, between 2012 and 2014, SRtRC put on a number of UK Department for Communities and Local Government (DCLG)-sponsored workshops to help 11-18 year olds reject the narratives of groups like the English Defence League. Finally, and after a successful second DCLG bid in December 2016, it has also begun educational workshops aimed at tackling hate crime more broadly.

Unfortunately, racist, sexist and other forms of abuse still plague football in Britain. In October 2017, the football anti-discrimination campaign, Kick It Out, received its highest number of UK reports in any year since records began — with 469 reports in 2016/17 trumping 402 in 2015/16. Such statistics also match more anecdotal evidence — with particularly nasty xenophobic instances arising at the start and end of the reporting period. In January 2017, for example, four Chelsea football fans were convicted of racist violence after a black commuter was pushed off a Paris subway and chanting: ‘We’re racist, we’re racist, and that’s the way we like it.’ Moreover, in December 2017, the Manchester City and England international striker, Raheem Sterling, was left in a state of ‘complete shock’ after being attacked by an individual as he was leaving a football training ground.

8. **Hate Crime**

Since 2007, hate crime has been administratively defined in the UK as ‘any criminal offence which is perceived, by the victim or any other person, to be motivated by hostility or prejudice towards someone based on a personal characteristic.’ British police officers can flag instances of hate crime (alongside other forms of crime) based upon one or more monitored strands that include race or

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91 Show Racism the Red Card. ‘About Us’, online at: [www.theredcard.org/about/](http://www.theredcard.org/about/).


94 Show Racism the Red Card’21st Annual Review’, online at: [https://static1.squarespace.com/static/574451fe37013bd0515647ac/t/5a54b40124a6947246d5d68b/1515500734071/SRtRC+Annual+Review+2017.pdf](https://static1.squarespace.com/static/574451fe37013bd0515647ac/t/5a54b40124a6947246d5d68b/1515500734071/SRtRC+Annual+Review+2017.pdf), p.5.


ethnicity; religion or beliefs; sexual orientation; disability; and transgender identity.\textsuperscript{99} While race and religious hate crimes might factor as a motivation for a wide number of offences (for example, harassment, assault and criminal damage), racially and religiously aggravated offences in the UK are defined separately by law.\textsuperscript{100} Both racially and religiously aggravated and non-aggravated offences, however, appear on the hate crime database under the first and second strands. Moreover, hate crime can extend to individuals who are wrongly targeted if they perceive that they have received abuse under the five monitoring strands. Finally, hate crimes based on age, gender and terrorist incidents are excluded from officially reported figures, as they are not deemed specific enough in nature to constitute a hate crime offence.\textsuperscript{101}

During the March-June period in 2017, Britain saw a large rise in racially and religious motivated hate crime – owing to the contemporaneous Manchester and London terror attacks. In the 2016/17 reporting period, the UK saw a 29% increase in hate crimes, representing the largest total amount for one year since records began in 2011/12.\textsuperscript{102} Looking more deeply into the statistics, the UK Home Office reported a 27% and 35% rise in racially and religiously motivated hate crimes, respectively.\textsuperscript{103} Importantly, the largest increase for the 2016/17 period was disablist (53%) and transgender (43%) hate crime offences. This was attributed to better awareness amongst both subjects and the police in reporting mechanisms and confidence in coming forward when such incidents happen.\textsuperscript{104} Racially motivated hate crime was still, however, by far the leading category reported in the year after the 2016 Brexit referendum and 2017 terror attacks – with 62,685 offences recorded between March 2016 and March 2017.\textsuperscript{105} The largest spike in hate crime occurred immediately after the former event – with just over 5,500 offences recorded in July 2016.\textsuperscript{106} Moreover, a Freedom of Information request found that UK hate crime targeting Mosques had almost doubled during the reporting period – with 110 acts of racist abuse, acts of vandalism and bomb threats occurring mainly in areas affected by the 2017 terror attacks.\textsuperscript{107}

Looking beyond officially reported statistics, hate crime reported to third party recording agencies also saw an appreciable uptick in anti-Semitic, homophobic and anti-Muslim hate crime in the period under consideration. The Community Security Trust (CST), a body specifically set up to protect the UK Jewish community in 1994, reported that it had also recorded its highest annual total of anti-

\textsuperscript{99} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{100} Ibid, p.3.
\textsuperscript{101} Full Fact (17 October 2017) ‘Hate crime in England and Wales’, online at: https://fullfact.org/crime/hate-crime-england-and-wales/.
\textsuperscript{106} Ibid. p.6.
Semitic incidents in 2017. In particular, the CST found a 34% increase in anti-Semitic assaults, with three quarters of total anti-Semitic incidents taking place in Greater Manchester and Greater London. Causal factor for an increase in incidents could not be identified with certainty by the CST. However, a report on 2017 figures suggested that it might have resulted from an increased police presence after the Manchester and London terror attacks, as well as ongoing controversies to do with anti-Semitism in the UK Labour Party.

Other third party organisations also highlighted the rise of homophobic hate crime during the period under review. In September 2017, the gay rights charity, Stonewall, commissioned a survey to investigate experiences of homophobic, bi-phobic and transphobic hate crimes, as well as day-to-day discrimination. Conducting a YouGov poll of 5,000 adults in the UK, Stonewall found one in five (21%) LGBT people had experienced hate crime in the year 2016/2017. It also found that two in five Transgender people had experienced hate crime because of their gender identity, and that one in six Lesbian, Gay and Bisexual people had also experienced hate crime. Moreover, under-reporting to the authorities was a key feature of LGBT people’s experience, with fully four out of five who experienced such incidents not reporting them to the police. Finally, roughly a third of those polled found that they avoided certain streets or holding their partner’s hand on security grounds. The authors of the report suggested that a 78% increase in hate crime from 2013 was the result of greater awareness and better reporting practices, but also a ‘genuine increase’ over the reporting period; key sources of discrimination included leisure venues, the rental market and religious organisations.

There were no figures collected from third party reporting agencies about anti-Muslim hate crimes in the period under study. In November 2017, however, the third-party reporting service, Tell MAMA, released independently verified figures for the 2016 period. What they found was a 47% increase in in the number of anti-Muslim street incidents, rising from 437 in 2015 to 642 in 2016. Verbal and non-verbal forms of abuse made up the largest percentage of offline incidents – with a particular focus (56%) on female members of the UK Muslim community. Moreover, and continuing this gendered theme, 66% of perpetrators were identified as white males – with abusive language often taking on misogynistic overtones. Online anti-Muslim incidents actually decreased (by 15%) in 2016 – with better collection and verification methods cited as a key explanatory factor. The report also noted a 475% increase in anti-Muslim attacks after the EU referendum, with

110 Ibid. p.5.
112 Ibid. p.6.
113 Ibid.
114 Ibid.
115 Ibid., p.11.
117 Ibid., p.7
118 Ibid., p.40.
references to popular discourses on immigration and terrorism being predominant in recorded hate incidents.  

9. Glorification of Nazism

As mentioned above, the UK neo-Nazi scene has become even more marginal over the period of reporting – with the proscription of National Action and its offshoots largely deflating any potential rises in 2017. Despite its electoral toxicity, this is not to say, however, that neo-Nazism, overt fascism and the glorification of National Socialism have been completely erased from the fringes of the UK radical right. The campaigning organisation, Hope not Hate’s, 2018 ‘State of Hate’ report found seven active fascistic or Nazi ‘groupuscules’ that litter the extremes of UK radical right politics. Among the most significant of these (in terms of membership) are the White Power music network, Blood & Honour; the neo-Nazi street movement, the Misanthropic Division; and the BNP’s former security branch, Combat 18. Turning to the former, 2017 was a ‘disastrous year’ for Blood & Honour, seeing attendance down 80% at its annual Ian Stuart Donaldson memorial gig. Moreover, after successfully forging links with other neo-Nazi and counter-jihad street movements in 2016, Combat 18 ‘went back to sleep in 2017’. By contrast, the UK’s Misanthropic Division highlighted the increasingly transnational nature of radical right scene – recruiting pro-Nazi sympathisers from the UK to fight in Ukraine under the auspices of the Azov Battalion.

Moving away from the organised neo-Nazi scene, a more worrying UK trend has been the rise in (attempted) terrorist violence by glorifiers of German Nazism and the radical right more generally. On 23 June 2017 – one year to the day after the vote to leave the European Union – a 20-year-old neo-Nazi sympathiser, Ethan Stables, attempted to attack a gay pride event in the Cumbrian town of Barrow-in-Furness. Becoming increasingly immersed in Nazi ideology from September 2016, Stables was reported to the police by an alarmed member of the ‘National Socialists Union standing against the New World Order’ Facebook group. Earlier in the reporting period, another incident of neo-Nazi terrorism came to light, this time in response to the Manchester terror attack. Radicalised online by prominent anti-Islam UK activists and after watching a drama

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119 Ibid., p.7.
121 Ibid., p.28.
122 Ibid., p.29.
123 Ibid. p.27.
127 Ibid.
128 Dearden, L. (2 February 2018) ‘Finsbury Park terror attacker Darren Osborne jailed for life after driving van into Muslims near mosque’. The Independent, online at:
about real-life grooming scandal in Greater Manchester, 129 48-year-old Darren Osborne hired a van and targeted Muslim worshippers meeting to prayer at the Finsbury Park Mosque in London. Sentenced to 43 years in prison for murder and attempted murder, Osborne was overheard in a pub the night before the attack that he was ‘going to kill all Muslims’.130 The rise in so-called ‘lone wolves’ acting alone to carry out radical right acts of political violence and terrorism remains a pressing security threat in Britain today.

10. Human Rights in Britain

There were no high-profile instances of repression by the state directed at anti-fascist or human rights activists during the period under consideration. However, Britain’s progress in meeting international norms in relation to human rights regimes did come under scrutiny. In September 2017, for example, it was highlighted that Britain had failed to support over 100 UN human rights targets, ranging from the rights of children to the international law on abortion.131 In particular, one note of exception to the European norm was Britain’s inability to set limits on how long someone can be held in an immigration detention centre. Another was the potential threat that the post-Brexit landscape posed to Britain’s European commitments in relation to human rights, which remains unresolved. Moreover, according to UN Human Rights Commission, the UK is still yet to sign two key treaties: the first being the ‘Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance’ (CED); and the second being the ‘International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families’ (CMW).132

11. Conclusions

Mainly owing to the incidence of several terror attacks in March-June 2017, the period under study has shown a vexing increase in religious and racial intolerance in Britain. In stark contrast, the electoral fortunes of radical nationalist parties remain at an all-time low. As shown above, what, however, explains this apparent paradox is the organisational fragmentation and marginalisation of the UK radical right and radical Islamists by mainstream forces. In particular, repeated Government proscriptions and, for the radical right, the ability of Theresa May’s Conservative Party to adopt socially conservative policies and be seen as the most competent deliverer of a ‘hard’ Brexit immediately after the June 2016 Referendum has ensured that the Tory party is the main beneficiary of UKIP’s electoral collapse. The uptick in hate crime after the 2016 EU Referendum and 2017 terror attacks can therefore be seen as part of a rise in popular racism, post-Brexit – albeit one which


established radical nationalist (and to a large extent radical Islamist) actors cannot take advantage of.

Overall, despite the troubling trends in post-Brexit Britain, however, the climate of humanitarian norms and safeguards against discrimination has largely held. According to the latest Eurobarometer survey, positive popular attitudes towards migrants from other EU states rose more markedly in Britain than the cross-EU average, whilst concerns over immigration seem to have almost halved. Moreover, the UK has a developed system of equality and anti-incitement laws that has gone some way in safeguarding ethnic or religious minorities from threats by radical right groups and ideologues. Additionally, awareness of hate crime reporting, as well as the methodologies for capturing hate attacks, have also improved substantially over the last handful of years. Whilst underreporting remains a substantial challenge, victims from religious, racial and sexual minorities have become more confident in reporting crimes motivated by prejudice and open hostility, based upon their protected characteristics.

In sum, then, while this report shows that there has been concerning upticks in hate crime and incidents of prejudicial rhetoric at the elite level over the period of reporting, organised forms of hatred have actually decreased. Moreover, awareness and reporting of such instances has increased. Government and third-party organisations should therefore actively focus their attention on building on this strong foundation – making the recording of hate crime even more prevalent and continuing to curb hate groups where criminal intent is evident. This will help the protection of minorities and prevent the spread of radicalism in the years to come.

12. Recommendations

Too often, policy recommendations are comparatively easy to advance, and rather more difficult to implement. Barriers to the latter not only include pragmatic implementation, but there are also challenges in getting relevant agencies and institutions to accept key findings; and perhaps above all, in providing evidence for the benefits of specific policy solutions. In this vein, comparatively fewer but deeper, more expansive and actionable policy suggestions advanced here may represent a helpful way forward. With this in mind, the following five recommendations are aimed at policy makers and key stakeholders alike, with an emphasis placed upon overcoming barriers to enactment. To this end, the following policy recommendations are advanced in order of challenges to being taken up, ranging from more straightforward to more complex implementation.

A. In countering xenophobia and radical – and extremism more generally, amongst any one of any number of cognate phenomena – joined up thinking is essential. Practical solutions exist, and our digitally interconnected world is able to swap good ideas as never before. Since the radical right is more transnationally linked than ever before; correspondingly, international partnerships should be so too. Thus, ahead of a June 2017 Britain First rally in the UK and beyond, nationalists abroad travelling to the event were interdicted by Britain’s border police. In one case, the ‘Christianist’ Jacek Miedlar, described as a ‘fanatical hate preacher’ was detained upon arrival at Birmingham International Airport – thanks to the collaboration between Polish and British security services.\(^{133}\) In this way, when it comes radical right extremism, ‘best practice’ must be more than just a buzzword. Sharing what works is more important than ever before.

When it comes to Britain, this can take the form of local, regional or national success stories, which need to be embedded and widely disseminated. At the top-down level, for instance, putting anti-Muslim prejudice on the same unacceptable footing as BAME racism and anti-Semitism – as well as other forms of scapegoating minorities, which remains the *sine qua non* for radical right activism – is a particularly welcome step forward. In the wake of the Finsbury Park terrorist attack last year, Prime Minister Theresa May gave a ground-breaking speech in June 2017 identifying anti-Muslim prejudice, that new ‘lowest common denominator’ of radical right prejudice, as a form of unacceptable ‘extremism’ in contemporary Britain.\(^{134}\) She was right to do so, and more such leadership is needed from political elites – and not just them. Indeed, celebrities, sporting heroes, and other public figures can all play a role in marginalising extremism nationally, using their substantial clout to put far right groups and militants on notice: they will be closely held to the laws and norms that are part and parcel of liberal democracy. Extremism, from whatever quarter from which it derives, will no longer tolerated in Britain.

Yet approaches to the radical right in Britain needs more than top down policies. A fresh look at what works in different national contexts is no less worthwhile. One example is provided in Wales, which has signed the UN Convention of the Rights of the Child - defining the latter up to the age of 25. This opens the door to a less ‘securitised’ approach to radical right criminality, allowing for educational and third sector interventions that involve less stigmatisation than, say, prosecution or prison. Likewise in Holyrood, the Scottish Parliament, progressive legislation was enacted in 2009 regarding ‘racially aggravated harassment’; in 2012, Scotland also passed the Threatening Communications Act – which can be applied to hate attacks online.\(^{135}\) These examples are precisely the types of laws that can hamstring far right recruitment and radicalisation on one hand, and rhetoric as well as incitement on the other; they should be shared in other regional and national – and even international – contexts in order to make life more difficult for radical right groups and their activists.

Nor should local knowledge and initiatives be overlooked. Grassroots campaigns and bottom-up engagement, where appropriate and replicable, should also be disseminated as widely as possible. Two local examples in the British context bear mentioning here, even if many others exist. First, in countering ‘defence league’ demonstrations, it has long been the case that the large majority of arrests are from the ‘anti-fascists’ side. To some extent, changing police tactics – such as ensuring groups are kept as separate as possible or moving demonstrations to the outskirts of cities and towns – can only go so far. Those in the firing line often know best how to defuse potentially violent situations; thus, in York during 2013, a local mosque faced down an EDL protest with tea, biscuits and a football kick-about in mixed groups.\(^{136}\) How many other counter-demonstrations might benefit from such local ingenuity? Likewise in Edinburgh, a ‘Charter for Public Transport’ was launched in June 2017, which aimed to make travel ‘hate free’.\(^{137}\) This initiative extends to hosting road shows, public pledges to report hate attacks, and ‘special talks’ aimed at raising public awareness. All of

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these wise ideas belong in cities across Britain. Still more generally, furthermore, drawing upon best practice from transnational no less than local knowledge remains the best way to consolidate the most effective responses to radical right extremism.

B. Targeted research funding on what ‘successful’ anti-far right policies entail. Do banning orders work? Can the German distinction between ‘radical’ right (hostile to, but accepting of, the democratic order) and ‘extreme’ right groups (who reject liberal democracy and aim for a right-wing revolution) be mapped across Europe, let alone beyond? These and related questions simply have not been sufficiently addressed to date. The UK’s issuing of banning orders against National Action was widely praised in November 2016; but was it successful? As with crime or drugs, it can be the case that police (and derivatively, the security services) prefer congregations rather than dispersals of anti-social behaviour. This can aid in monitoring trouble-spots and ringleaders; but is it also the case with ideological militants like the extreme right National Action? As noted in Feldman and Stocker’s chapter on the far right in post-Brexit Britain, National Action was the first fascist group to be banned in the UK since the Second World War; however, it is the 85th such group to have been proscribed in this century (the other proscribed groups are jihadi Islamists and Northern Ireland paramilitaries). Is this strategy effective? Does proscribing revolutionary groups lead to their disbanding, or to their increased militancy, or to going ‘underground’? The short answer is that we do not know for sure. Too little empirical research on this area has been undertaken, whether in Britain, Europe, or beyond.

So too with CVE and associated deradicalisation programmes. Which initiatives work best, and which (such as the ‘conveyor belt’ theory) are not broadly applicable? With respect to self-activating, ‘lone-wolf’ terrorists, it seems clear that profiling is unrealistic, and can even be counterproductive. For instance, for every 15-50-year-old ‘lone wolf’ terrorist – the standard ‘profile’ of self-directed terrorists – there are cases such as James von Brunn in the United States, who attacked the United States Memorial Museum in 2009, aged 88. So too with focussing upon ‘loners’, or those with mental health challenges. In the case of the former, some ‘lone wolves’ are well-integrated into society, or appear to be highly functioning individuals, such as the Norwegian mass murder, Anders Behring Breivik. So too with mental illness: fewer than 1 in 20 million people facing such challenges resort to violence. Stigmatising and overgeneralization, surely, must be avoided at all costs.

Yet the lesson is doubtless also a broader one. Whether profiling, banning orders, or CVE programmes like Britain’s Prevent more generally, empirical findings are all too often lacking. This leads to an initial, uncontentious two-part recommendation. Above all, detailed quantitative studies are desperately needed. To do so, funding for researchers – whether based in universities, third sector organisations or elsewhere – should be targeted at questions of utility: what approaches work best? Here, specific calls should be made to test the viability of specific programmes and interventions. Correspondingly, government agencies – who are invariably best placed to host and monitor such public-facing research calls - should be encouraged to share otherwise classified details with selected, pre-screened experts. In this way, sharing confidential information with key stakeholders, and financially supporting such overdue work, is clearly in the public good. Moreover, successful policies could easily be much expanded – whether through regional, national or even international bodies.

C. Greater institutional attention placed upon far-right extremism, both media and governmental. American researchers recently found that, in the US, jihadi Islamists committed 12.4% of attacks between 2011 and 2015, but received 41.4% of media coverage on terrorist attacks; put another
way, ‘there was a 449 per cent increase in media attention when the perpetrator was Muslim’.\textsuperscript{138} As with terrorism, so too with other forms of extremism beyond the US, including non-violent radicalisation. In the case of Britain, it is clear that disproportionate attention was initially placed upon jihadi Islamism; in fact, the initial version of Prevent (2006) as well as and the wider ‘Contest’ strategy of which it forms one of four counter-terrorism pillars, did not mention far-right extremism at all. Given the appalling bombings in Britain on 7 July 2005 – which killed 52 innocents in London, sending shockwaves through the country – this is quite understandable as a CVE reaction to jihadi Islamism. Yet the policy diverted resources from other forms of extremism; above all, far-right threats of violence and terrorism, while raising trenchant criticisms of governmental attention being unfairly targeted so-called ‘suspect communities’. Many observers felt this single-issue focus was ‘alienating’ precisely those BAME groups needed in the fight against jihadi Islamism.\textsuperscript{139}

To some extent, more recent iterations of Prevent (notably in 2011) have corrected this error; it now explicitly engages with all forms of extremism in the UK, including that of the far-right. Yet this CVE programme has not avoided charges of remaining ‘toxic’ in the words of the recently-installed Mayor of Manchester, Andy Burnham.\textsuperscript{140} More to the point, has the Prevent strategy, in the words of Diane Abbott MP, the shadow Home Secretary, ‘failed to change the attitudes of those on the far right’?\textsuperscript{141} The increase in far-right referrals to Prevent, as well as to the UK’s deradicalisation programme, the Channel Project, would suggest that, at the very least, this has been the case until recently. In terms of Channel, for example, in 2015/16 only 14% of referrals, or roughly 1 in 7 cases, have related to the radical right.

In turn, that figure went up more than 10% in the six months since then, so that, according in the words of Security Minister Ben Wallace MP, roughly ‘a quarter of people who are supported by the voluntary Channel programme are far right concerns – the Prevent strategy deals with all forms of terrorism and does not focus on any one community.’\textsuperscript{142} With far right referrals up to fully 30% in 2016/7 – and in some regions of Britain, representing more than half of all Channel interventions – much has changed in the 10 years since the programme was launched. Yet more still needs to be done.\textsuperscript{143}

\textsuperscript{138} Kentish, B. (3 July 2017), Terror attacks receive five times more media coverage if perpetrator is Muslim, study finds’. The Independent, online at: www.independent.co.uk/news/world/0/terror-attacks-media-coverage-muslim-islamist-white-racism-islamophobia-study-georgia-state-a7820726.html.


\textsuperscript{140} The ‘i’ Team (4 July 2017). The Independent, ‘Prevent: time for a radical rethink of our counter-extremism strategy?’, online at: https://inews.co.uk/news/prevent-time-radical-rethink-counter-extremism-strategy/.


\textsuperscript{142} Yorke, H. (15 February 2017). The Telegraph, ‘One in four ‘extremists’ reported to Government’s deradicalisation programme are far-Right sympathisers, figures show, online: www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2017/02/15/one-four-extremists-reported-governments-deradicalisation-programme/.

\textsuperscript{143} Pasha-Robinson, L. (19 June 2017). The Independent, ‘Number of far-right extremism flagged to Government terror unit soars 30% in a year’, online at: www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/home-
Reinventing the wheel is unnecessary, and greater and more visible use of existing legislation is strongly recommended. Given the pervasive nature of both anti-Semitism and Islamophobia across the far-right, recourse to racial and religious hatred statutes is, surely, a no-brainer. Examples of ringleaders should be made legally, and chances taken with prosecutions of borderline cases. Moreover, the preponderance of minority abuse could effectively be addressed by greater recourse to aggravated harassment laws already on the books, while the 1936 Public Order Act could also be expanded. With respect to the latter, in fact, in January 2015 Britain First co-leader Paul Golding was convicted under this legislation, and in November 2016 Jayda Fransen; the movement’s other leader, was convicted under the same legislation. On the whole, laws exist to combat a resurgent far-right, and this should be very publicly redoubled. Such initiatives would have the effect of both reassuring minority communities in Britain – the disproportionate victims of far-right aggression – while at the same time taking a firm stand against all forms of illegal bigotry and extremism. One specific suggestion, therefore, is to publish and widely circulate an open source dossier on media and governmental initiatives aimed at combatting far-right extremism, including a description of laws that could be deployed as well as workable intervention scenarios for encouraging specific projects and/or highlighting deradicalisation successes.

D. Better understanding and countering of hate incidents. Hate incidents and crimes can have devastating effects. They can cause distress and anxiety, leaving affected individuals feeling both isolated and targeted. Hate crimes can lead entire minority communities to feel insecure and under direct threat. This can have disastrous ramifications for community cohesion, and in some cases, may even lead to social disengagement and individual radicalisation. A ‘zero tolerance’ approach to hate incidents and crimes is therefore necessary. Yet at the same time, we know too little about causes and drivers of hate abuse. Are hate attacks more frequently opportunistic and individual, or group based and planned? Are some groups or geographical ‘hot spots’ more vulnerable than others? What strategies for reassuring ‘at risk’ communities and countering ethnic/religious hatred work best? These questions have yet to be satisfactorily answered, and to be sure, our understanding of hate crimes remains partial. Likewise, underreporting remains a major concern, with fewer than half of hate incidents likely recorded by authorities. Building trust, robust metrics and supporting targeted communities therefore goes hand in hand. Here, there are three specific recommendations that could be taken up, both in Britain and more widely.

First and foremost, a better picture of hate attacks is needed. This particularly includes greater disaggregation of data into the key strands of hate incidents and crimes: sexuality; ethnicity; religion; disability and ‘alternative lifestyles’ (the latter including, for instance, protection of ‘Goths’, as has been practiced by Greater Manchester Police). To date, few policing bodies have disaggregated data into these strands, and this should be a statutorily-required practice amongst all 44 police forces across the United Kingdom. Doing so would give a more nuanced, and importantly, local and regional, picture of hate attacks, thus facilitating targeted, specific interventions. That said, by their nature, individuals have multiple identities, dubbed ‘intersectionality’. For instance, three reports by the Centre for Fascist, Anti-fascist and Post-fascist Studies have shown that, unlike all other forms of hate crimes – which are overwhelmingly male-on-male – Muslim women, often visibly identified as such (through wearing the abaya or hijab, for instance), represent the striking majority of victims

targeted in anti-Muslim attacks. This could be driven by gender and ethnicity and religion. Yet again, we need to know more, drilling down into the drivers of hate incidents and attacks. Accordingly, the more fine-grained the evidence – whether regional, local, intersectional or personal – the better.

Second and derivatively, independent confirmation of these figures is needed. This is important not only with case verification and robust data analytics, but would also have the beneficial effect of increasing trust – both of police and governmental bodies, and of the findings themselves. Already at the forefront of this work are third sector monitoring bodies with wide-ranging expertise, not only of helping and advising victims, but of independently compiling metrics and forming conclusions. To take but two examples most relevant to radical right hate attacks, with respect to anti-Semitism in the UK, the Community Security Trust has more than three decades of reporting experience, which remains the gold-standard for reporting bodies. Furthermore, they have been the model upon which other third sector bodies have been based, not only given their reputation for sophisticated empirical analysis, but the trust and great familiarity within the UK’s Jewish community. Thus, when the CST finds that anti-Semitic hate attacks are at a record level in the first half of 2017, they have both the standing and experience to raise the alarm – one that must be both heeded, and then acted upon. Similarly, we now know that enormous spikes in anti-Muslim attacks take place in the wake of jihadi Islamist acts of terrorism, thanks to the work of Tell MAMA (the latter an acronym for Measuring Anti-Muslim Attacks). For example, there was a 373% spike in hate attacks following the horrific murder of Drummer Lee Rigby on 22 May 2013. Since that time, this third sector groups have found that a mosque in Britain has been attacked on nearly a weekly basis. Support for the work of these and other anti-hate crime groups is essential, ranging from funding and sharing data to publicising findings and public-private partnerships.

Third, it remains the case that most hate incidents and crimes take place online. Alongside dissuading users from this abhorrent practice and enjoining governments to crackdown where applicable laws exist, online platforms must be convinced to take this matter more seriously. Encouraging news recently saw Facebook hiring some 3,000 staff as part of a ‘community operations team’ to combat hate speech – even if questions persist over levels of radical right extremism on that platform. So too with Twitter and other platforms; even Google and other search engines have pledged to take down hateful or extremist content.

Yet public pressure and corporate social responsibility only go so far. No doubt this issue also goes beyond hate attacks: as the UK’s independent reviewer of terrorism legislation, Max Hill QC has

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argued: ‘social media plays a pivotal role in communication between those intent on terrorism’. To this end, both national and transnational initiatives should be strongly encouraged. Both can play a key role; in terms of the latter, for instance, the United Nations are working with leading ‘tech giants’ to combat online hatred and extremism. Even if social media scarcely respects national boundaries, Germany has shown that accounts hosted within its borders can be subject to fines of up to €50 million. In this way, both carrot and stick can be employed to remove hateful, inciting, extremist and terrorist content online – all areas in which the far right is active. In this effort, everyone from companies and stakeholders to individual users and governmental bodies can all play a positive role. This needs to be strongly encouraged, including through public campaigns – both online and offline.

E. In terms of legal agreements, finally, there are a number of United Nations conventions that the UK has not signed or ratified that could potentially strengthen the position of migrants and minorities within the country. In particular, the ‘Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance’ (CED) and the ‘International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families’ (CMW) need to be both signed and ratified in order to ensure norms against the abduction and concealment of individuals and mistreatment of migrant workers are enforced internationally.

One major legal safeguard whose longevity has been subject to doubt during the reporting period is the UK’s status as a signatory of the EU Convention on Human Rights, post-Brexit. Whilst still enshrined into UK law under the Human Rights Act 1998, the UK Government needs to make good on safeguarding protections provided against discrimination, undue punishment and degrading treatment under the Charter. In January 2018, a majority of MP’s also voted against the UK’s status as a signatory of the wider Charter of Fundamental rights. A British Bill of Rights has been suggested as a possible alternative in the past – although details about the Government plans were not forthcoming at the time of writing. Better safeguards need to be put in place to make sure that subjects’ political and legal rights are ensured, post-March 2019.

While minorities in the UK are becoming more confident in reporting hate crime, greater steps need to be made by law enforcement in order to boost confidence when coming forward. As shown above, sexual minorities and the disabled are particularly reluctant to report hate crimes. More generally, then, better engagement is need with these communities in order to foster trust and understanding. Finally, and picking up on the two non-signed UN treaties, the UK needs to do better in ensuring the human rights of those who a subject to enforced disappearance and migrant

workers; both in the UK but also globally. The UK cannot turn a blind eye to the ‘least, the lost and the last’. 